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PAST PRACTICE AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTSt 
Richard M ittenthal* 
IN a recent United States Supreme Court decision, Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority, stated that "the labor arbi-
trator's source of law is not confined to the express provisions of the 
contract, as the industrial common law-the practices of the in-
dustry and the shop-is equally a part of the collective bargaining 
agreement although not expressed in it."1 When compared to 
actual management-union experiences in contract administration, 
this dictum seems unduly broad. It may be premature as well, for 
no coherent "rationale of grievance arbitration" has yet been de-
veloped.2 If such a rationale is to be achieved, far more work must 
be done in identifying and analyzing the standards which serve to 
shape arbitral opinions. The purpose of this paper is to examine 
in depth one of the more im:eortant standards upon which so many 
of our decisions are based-past practice. Custom and practice 
profoundly influence every area of human activity. Protocol 
guides the relations between states; etiquette affects an individual's 
social behavior; habit governs most of our daily actions; and mores 
help to determine our laws. It is hardly surprising, therefore, to 
find that past practice in an industrial plant plays a significant role 
in the administration of the collective agreement. 
Past practice is one of the most useful and hence one of the 
most commonly used aids in resolving grievance disputes. It can 
help the arbitrator in a variety of ways in interpreting the agree-
ment. It may be used to clarify what is ambiguous, to give sub-
stance to what is general, and perhaps even to modify or amend 
what is seemingly unambiguous. It may also, apart from any 
basis in the agreement, be used to establish a separate, enforceable 
condition of employment. I have explored each of these functions 
of past practice in some detail. And I have sought to describe the 
nature of a practice as well-that is, its principal characteristics, 
its duration, and so on. 
t This paper was delivered at the fourteenth annual meeting of the National Academy 
of Arbitrators. The proceedings of that meeting, including this paper, will be published 
in their entirety by the Bureau of National Affairs, "Washington, D.C., later this year. 
• Member, Michigan and New York Bars.-Ed. 
1 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-
82 (1960). 
2 See Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration in the Light of the Lincoln Mills Case, 
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, ARBITRATION AND THE I.Aw 24, 26 (BNA 1959). 
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I. THE NATURE OF A PRACTICE 
The facts in a case may be readily ascertainable but the arbitra-
tor then must determine what their significance is, whether they 
add up to a practice, and if so, what that practice is. These ques-
tions confront us whenever the parties base their argument on a 
claimed practice. They cannot be answered by generalization. 
For a practice is ordinarily the unique product of a particular 
plant's history and tradition, a particular group of employees and 
supervisors, and a particular set of circumstances which made it 
viable in the first place. Thus, in deciding the threshold question 
of whether a practice exists, we must look to the plant setting rather 
than to theories of contract administration. 
Although the conception of what constitutes a practice differs 
from one employer to another and from one union to another, 
there are certain characteristics which typify most practices. These 
characteristics have been noted in many arbitration decisions.3 
For example, in the steel industry, Sylvester Garrett has lucidly 
defined a practice in these words: 
"A custom or practice is not something which arises simply 
because a given course of conduct has been pursued by Man-
agement or the employees on one or more occasions. A 
custom or a practice is a usage evolved by men as a normal 
reaction to a recurring type situation. It must be shown to be 
the accepted course of conduct characteristically repeated in 
response to the given set of underlying circumstances. This 
is not to say that the course of conduct must be accepted in 
the sense of both parties having agreed to it, but rather that it 
must be accepted in the sense of being regarded by the men 
involved as the normal and proper response to the underlying 
circumstances presented. "4 
3 See, e.g., Curtis Companies, Inc., 29 Lab. Arb. 434 (1957); Celanese Corp. of America, 
24 Lab. Arb. 168 (1954); Sheller Mfg. Corp., 10 Lab. Arb. 617 (1948). 
4 Sylvester Garrett, Chairman, Board of Arbitration, U. S. Steelworkers, Grievance No. 
NL-453, Docket No. N-146, Jan. 31, 1953. Reported at 2 Steelworkers Arbitration Bull. 
1187. A similar definition can be found in some judicial opinions. 
In Jarecki Mfg. Co. v. Merriam, 104 Kan. 646, 649, 180 P. 224, 225 (1919), the court 
stated: "Persons are presumed to contract with reference to a custom or usage which 
pertains to the subject of the contract. To constitute a custom which tacitly attends the 
obligation of a contract, the habit, mode, or course of dealing in the particular trade, 
business, or locality must be definite and certain; must be well settled and established; 
must be uniformly and universally prevalent and observed; must be of general notoriety; 
and must have been acquiesced in without contention or dispute so long and so continu-
ously that contracting parties either had it in mind or ought to have had in mind, and 
consequently contracted, or presumptively contracted, with reference to it." See also Mc-
Comb v. C. A. Swanson & Sons, 77 F. Supp. 716, 734 (1948). 
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In short, something qualifies as a practice if it is shown to be the 
understood and accepted way of doing things over an extended 
period of time. 
What qualities must a course of conduct have before it can 
legitimately be regarded as a practice? First, there should be 
clarity and consistency. A course of conduct which is vague and 
ambiguous or which has been contradicted as often as it has been 
followed can hardly qualify as a practice. But where those in the 
plant invariably respond the same way to a particular set of condi-
tions, their conduct may very well ripen into a practice. Second, 
there should be longevity and repetition. A period of time has 
to elapse during which a consistent pattern of behavior emerges. 
Hence, one or two isolated instances of certain conduct do not 
ordinarily establish a practice. Just how frequently and over how 
long a period something must be done before it can be charac-
terized as a practice is a matter of good judgment for which no 
formula can be devised. Third, there should be acceptability. 
The employees and the supervisors alike must have knowledge of 
the particular conduct and must regard it as the correct and cus-
tomary means of handling a situation. Such acceptability may 
frequently be implied from long acquiescence in a known course 
of conduct. Where this acquiescence does not exist, that is, where 
employees constantly protest a particular course of action through 
complaints and grievances, it is doubtful that any practice will be 
created. 
One must consider too the underlying circumstances which 
give a practice its true dimensions. A practice is no broader than 
the circumstances out of which it arose, although its scope can al-
ways be enlarged in the day-to-day administration of the agree-
ment. No meaningful description of a practice can be made 
without mention of these circumstances. For instance, a work 
assignment practice which develops on the afternoon and mid-
night shifts and which is responsive to the peculiar needs of night 
work cannot be automatically extended to the day shift as well. 
The point is that every practice must be carefully related to its 
origin and purpose. And, finally, the significance to be attributed 
to a practice may possibly be affected by whether or not it is sup-
ported by mutuality. Some practices are the product, either in 
their inception or in their application, of a joint understanding; 
others develop from choices made by the employer in the exercise 
of its managerial discretion without any intention of a future 
commitment. 
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A. Subject Matter 
Practices usually relate to some phase of the contractual rela-
tionship between the employer and his employees. They may con-
cern such subjects as scheduling, overtime, promotions, and the 
uses of seniority, all of which are covered to some extent in the 
typical collective agreement. But practices may also involve 
extra-contractual considerations-from the giving of Thanksgiving 
turkeys and Christmas bonuses to the availability of free parking. 
Still other practices, although this characterization may be argu-
able, have more to do with managerial discretion in operating a 
plant than with the employment relationship. For example, the 
long-time use of inter-department hand trucks for moving material 
might be regarded as a practice, and the truckers who do this work 
certainly have an interest in preserving this method of operation. 
But could it be seriously argued that this practice would prohibit 
the employer from introducing a conveyor belt to replace the 
hand trucks? Most agreements provide, usually in a management 
rights clause, that methods of manufacture are solely within the 
employer's discretion. There may even be practices which have 
nothing whatever to do with the employment relationship. The 
long-time assignment of a certain number of foremen to a given 
department might be viewed by some as a practice but it could 
hardly preclude the employer from using fewer foremen. What 
I am suggesting here is that the mere existence of a practice, with-
out more, has no real significance. Only if the practice clarifies an 
imperfectly expressed contractual obligation or lends substance 
to an indefinitely expressed obligation or creates a completely in-
dependent obligation will it have some effect on the parties' 
relationship. 
Because practices may relate to any phase of an employer's 
business, some parties have seen fit to spell out limitations on the 
kind of subject matter a practice may cover. In the steel industry, 
for instance, a practice is referred to as a "local working condition" 
and it is binding only if it provides "benefits . .. in excess of or in 
addition to" those provided in the agreement.5 And in determin-
ing what constitutes a "benefit," steel arbitrators have applied an 
objective rather than a subjective test. Hence, whether the ag-
grieved employees like or dislike the practice in dispute is ir-
relevant. The decisive question, instead, is whether an ordinary 
employee.in the same situation would reasonably regard the prac-
5 Section 2 B-3 of the U. S. Steel-Steelworkers Agreement. 
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tice as a substantial benefit in relation to his job. If so, the practice 
may be an enforceable "local working condition." 
The wide variety of possible subjects may make it difficult to 
decide the exact nature of a practice. Suppose certain extra work 
which periodically arises in department X has, as a matter of prac-
tice, been performed by X's employees at overtime rates but that 
this has always occurred when the entire plant was on a 40-hour 
week. Suppose too that this kind of practice is enforceable under 
the agreement. One day this extra work is made available when 
the plant is on a 32-hour week and the employer gives the work to 
employees from other departments as well as from X so as to pro-
vide the maximum number of men with 36 hours' work. How is 
the practice to be described? The union says it is a work assign-
ment practice, giving X's employees an exclusive claim to the 
disputed work whenever it is performed. The employer says it is 
an overtime practice, giving X's employees the disputed work only 
when it is to be performed at overtime rates. The problem-the 
proper scope of the practice-is manifest. Was it intended that the 
practice apply without limitation to all levels of operation or was 
it intended that the practice be restricted to the precise situation in 
which it had previously been applied? Some help in formulating 
an answer may be found in the purpose behind the practice. 
Hence, if it could be shown that the purpose was to have the work 
done in department X alone and that it was mere coincidence that 
the practice had always been applied when the employees were on 
a 40-hour schedule, the broad interpretation urged by the union 
would seem to be correct. Absent such a showing, I would think 
the narrow interpretation would have to be adopted. 
We must also be careful to distinguish between a practice and 
the results of a practice. Assume that a plant has two separate 
electrical crews, one for existing equipment and the other for new 
installations, and that overtime on a particular job has always been 
given to the crew which was actually working that job. Assume 
too that in implementing this practice over the years there has 
been a relatively equal distribution of overtime between the crews. 
From these facts, it cannot be said that equalization of overtime 
thereby became a practice. The equalization was simply one of 
the consequences, probably unintended, of applying the overtime 
assignment practice. If a practice were defined in terms of not 
only its subject matter but its consequences as well, it would surely 
develop a breadth far beyond what was originally intended. 
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B. Proof 
To allege the existence of a practice is one thing; to prove it is 
quite another. The allegation is a common one. But my experi-
ence indicates that where past practice is disputed, the party relying 
upon the practice is often unable to establish it. This is not sur-
prising. For the arbitrator in such a dispute is likely to find 
himself confronted by irreconcilable claims, sharply conflicting 
testimony, and incomplete information. Harry Shulman ex-
pressed our dilemma in these words: 
"The Union's witnesses remember only the occasions on 
which the work was done in the manner they urge. Super-
vision remembers the occasions on which the work was done 
otherwise. Each remembers details the other does not; each 
is surprised at the other's perversity; and both forget or omit 
important circumstances. Rarely is alleged past practice clear, 
detailed, and undisputed; commonly, inquiry into past prac-
tice ... produces immersion in a bog of contradictions, frag-
ments, doubts, and one-sided views .... " 6 
The arbitrator, abandoned in this kind of maze, is almost certain 
to decide the grievance on some basis other than past practice. 
The only means of resolving the confusion, short of credibility 
findings, is through written records of the disputed events. Such 
records may be the best possible evidence of what took place in the 
past. Unfortunately, records of scheduling, work assignments, etc., 
are seldom maintained for any length of time. And even when 
available, they may be incomplete or it may be difficult and costly 
to reduce them to some meaningful form. Considering these 
problems, it is understandable that practices are most often held 
to exist where the parties are in substantial agreement as to what 
the established course of conduct has been. 
ll. FUNCTIONS OF p AST PRACTICE 
A. Clarifying Ambiguous Language 
The danger of ambiguity arises not only from the English 
language with its immense vocabulary, flexible grammar and loose 
syntax but also from the nature of the collective bargaining agree-
ment. The agreement is a means of governing "complex, many-
sided relations between large numbers of people in a going 
6 H. Shulman, Umpire, Ford Motor Co.-United Automobile Workers, Opinion A-278, 
Sept. 4, 1952. Reported at 19 Lab. Arb. 237, 242 (1952). 
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concern for very substantial periods of time."7 It is seldom -writ-
ten with the kind of precision and detail which characterize other 
legal instruments. Although it covers a great variety of subjects, 
many of which are quite complicated, it must be simply ·written so 
that its terms can be understood by the employees and their super-
visors. It is sometimes composed by persons inexperienced in the 
art of ·written expression. Issues are often settled by a general 
formula because the negotiators recognize they could not possibly 
foresee or provide for the many contingencies which are bound 
to occur during the life of the agreement. Indeed, any attempt to 
anticipate and dispose of problems before they arise would, I 
suspect, create new areas of disagreement and thus obstruct 
negotiations. Sooner or later the employer and the union must 
reach agreement if they wish to avoid the economic waste of a 
strike or lockout. Because of this pressure, the parties often defer 
the resolution of their differences-either by ignoring them or by 
·writing a provision which is so vague and uncertain as to leave the 
underlying issue open. 
These characteristics inevitably cause portions of the agreement 
to be expressed in ambiguous and general terms. With the 
passage of time, however, this language may be given a clear and 
practical construction, either through managerial action which is 
acquiesced in by the employees ( or, conceivably, employee action 
which is acquiesced in by management) or through the resolution 
of disputes on a case-by-case basis. This accumulation of plant 
experience results in the development of practices and procedures 
of varying degrees of consistency and force. Those responsible 
for the administration of the agreement can no more overlook 
these practices than they can the express provisions of the agree-
ment. For the established way of doing things is usually the con-
tractually correct way of doing things. And what has become a 
mutually acceptable interpretation of the agreement is likely to 
remain so. Hence, the full meaning of the agreement may fre-
quently depend upon how it has been applied in the past. 
Consider, for example, an agreement which provides for pre-
mium pay for "any work over eight hours in a day." An employee 
works his regular 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. shift on Monday but works from 
6 a.m. to 2 p.m. on Tuesday pursuant to a request by supervision. 
He asks for overtime for his first two hours (6 a.m. to 8 a.m.) on 
Tuesday. Whether his claim has merit depends upon how you 
7 Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MICH. L. REv. I, 22 
(1958). 
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construe the term "day." Did the parties mean a "calendar day" 
as the employer argues, or did they mean a "work day," that is, a 24-
hour period beginning with the time an employee regularly starts 
work, as the union argues? It may be possible to resolve this 
ambiguity through resort to practice. How the parties act under 
an agreement may be just as important as what they say in it. To 
borrow a well-known adage, "actions speak louder than words." 
From the conflict and accommodation which are daily occurrences 
in plant life, there arises "a context of practices, usages, and rule-
of-thumb interpretations" which gradually give substance to the 
ambiguous language of the agreement.8 A practice, once de-
veloped, is the best evidence of what the language meant to those 
who wrote it. 
By relying upon practice, the onus for the decision may be 
shifted from the arbitrator back to the parties. For to the extent 
to which the arbitrator adopts the interpretation given by the 
parties themselves as shown by their acts, he minimizes his own 
role in the construction process. The real significance of practice 
as an interpretative aid lies in the fact that the arbitrator is respon-
sive to the values and standards of the parties. A decision based 
on past practice emphasizes not the personal viewpoint of the 
arbitrator but rather the parties' own history, what they have 
found to be proper and agreeable over the years. Because such a 
decision is bound to reflect the parties' concept of rightness, it is 
more likely to resolve the underlying dispute and more likely to 
be acceptable. A solution created from within is always preferable 
to one which is imposed from without.9 
B. Implementing General Contract Language 
Practice is also a means of implementing general contract 
language. In areas which cannot be made specific, the parties are 
often satisfied to state a general rule and to allow the precise mean-
ing of the rule to develop through the day-to-day administration 
of the agreement. For instance, the right to discipline and dis-
charge is usually conditioned upon the existence of "just cause." 
Similarly, the right to deviate from a contract requirement may 
be conditioned upon the existence of "circumstances beyond the 
employer's control." General expressions of this kind are rarely 
defined. For no definition, however detailed, could anticipate all 
s Eastern Stainless Steel Corp., 12 Lab. Arb. 709, 713 (1949). 
9 See Seward, Arbitration in the World Today, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, 
THE PROFESSION OF LABOR ARBITRATION 66, 72-73 (BNA 1957). 
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the possibilities which might take place during the term of the 
agreement. But, in time, this kind of general language does tend 
to become more concrete. As the parties respond to the many 
different situations confronting them-approving certain principles 
and procedures, disputing others, and resolving their disputes in 
the grievance procedure-they find mutually acceptable ways of 
doing things which serve to guide them in future cases. Instead 
of rearguing every matter without regard to their earlier experi-
ences, acceptable principles and procedures are applied again and 
again. And, thus, practices arise which represent the reasonable 
expectations of the parties. These practices provide a sound basis 
for interpreting and applying general contract language. They 
can be used to help determine whether a particular condition was 
actually "beyond the employer's control" or whether a particular 
employee's behavior was "just cause" for discipline. 
Suppose, for example, that tardiness of less than five minutes 
has always been overlooked but that after it becomes extremely 
widespread management disciplines a few employees without any 
advance notice of its change in policy. In view of this long tolera-
tion of tardiness, it is doubtful that there would be "just cause" 
for discipline. Plant practice thus injects something tangible into 
the "just cause" provision, giving employees a clear notion of what 
is acceptable and unacceptable in plant behavior. Of course, once 
the men are notified that tardiness will no longer be ignored the 
employer would be free to take reasonable disciplinary action. 
Although, as I have just shown, discipline which is completely 
inconsistent with past practice is likely to lack "just cause," it does 
not follow that discipline must be perfectly consistent with past 
practice in order to establish "just cause." Suppose that fighting 
in the plant has in the past resulted in disciplinary suspensions of 
two to five weeks and that those who have been so disciplined were 
all men with considerable seniority. Then, a recently-hired em-
ployee starts a fight ·with no justification whatever and is dis-
charged. The union may argue that because others had received 
suspensions, the discharge was too severe a penalty. But one must 
remember that there are degrees of culpability and that discharge 
is hardly the same penalty when applied to an employee with one 
year's seniority and to another with twenty years' seniority. The 
employer should not be precluded from discharging this man 
merely because on earlier occasions it had good reason to be 
lenient. The point is that "it is not the fact of seeming incon-
sistency in past practice, but the cause of it, that ought to engage 
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the arbitrator's attention."10 Hence, what seems on the surface 
to be capricious administration of a disciplinary rule "may prove 
on closer inspection to be a flexible and humane application of a 
sound principle to essentially different situations."11 
C. Modifying or Amending Apparently Unambiguous Language 
What an agreement says is one thing; how it is carried out may 
be quite another. A recent study at the University of Illinois re-
vealed that differences between contract provisions and actual 
practice are not at all unusual.12 Thus, an arbitrator occasionally 
finds himself confronted with a situation where an established 
practice conflicts with a seemingly clear and unambiguous contract 
provision. Which is to prevail? The answer in many cases has 
been to disregard the practice and affirm the plain meaning of the 
contract language.13 
At the National Academy of Arbitrators' meeting in 1955, Ben 
Aaron forcefully argued that sometimes practice should prevail.14 
He posed a hypothetical situation which was based upon this con-
tract provision: 
"Where skill and physical capacity are substantially equal, 
seniority shall govern in the following situations only: promo-
tions, duwngrading, layoffs, and transfers." 
He assumed that the consistent practice for five years immediately 
preceding the dispute has been to treat seniority as the controlling 
consideration in the assignment of overtime work and that a griev-
ance has arisen out of the employer's sudden abandonment of that 
practice. He assumed further that the agreement vests in manage-
ment the right to direct the working forces subject only to qualifi-
cations or restrictions set forth elsewhere in the agreement and that 
the parties have expressly forbidden the arbitrator to add to, sub-
tract from, or modify any provision of the agreement. 
10 Aaron, The Uses of the Past in Arbitration, NATIONAL ACADEl\[Y OF ARBITRATORS, 
.ARBITRATION TODAY, 6, 11 (BNA 1955). Also found in Reprint No. 50 (Los Angeles: 
Institute of Industrial Relations, UCLA, 1955). 
lllbid. 
12 Derber, Chalmers &: Stagner, The Labor Contract: Provision and Practice, PERSON· 
NEL MAGAZINE (American Management Ass'n, Jan.-Feb. 1958). Also found in Reprint No. 
58 (Institute of Labor &: Industrial Relations, Univ. of Illinois, 1958). 
13 See, e.g., Sun Rubber Co., 228 Lab. Arb. 362, 368 (1957); Price-Pfister Brass Mfg. 
Co., 25 Lab. Arb. 398, 404 (1955); Bethlehem Steel Co., 21 Lab. Arb. 579, 582 (1953); 
Tide Water Oil Co., 17 Lab. Arb. 829, 833 (1952). See also the celebrated case of Western 
Union Telegraph Co. v. American Communications Assn., 299 N.Y. 177, 86 N.E.2d 162 
(1949). 
14 Aaron, supra note 10, at 3-7. 
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The conventional analysis of the problem begins with the pro-
position that the contract should be construed according to the 
parties' original intention. And the best evidence of their inten-
tion is generally found in the contract itself, that is, in the words 
which the parties themselves employed to express their intent. If 
these words are free from ambiguity and if their meaning is plain, 
there is no need to resort to interpretative aids such as past prac-
tice. This reasoning is well established in the law of contracts.15 
In the hypothetical case, the contract asserts that seniority is con-
trolling "in the following situations only: promotions, downgrad-
ing, layoffs, and transfers." On its face, this language contains no 
ambiguity whatever. By using the word "only," a more exclusive 
term would be hard to imagine, the parties evidently intended 
seniority to apply in the four situations mentioned but in no 
others. Hence, pursuant to the plain meaning of this clause, 
seniority would not govern overtime assignments and any practice 
to the contrary would have to be ignored. 
Aaron, however, says this may be too rigid an approach to the 
problem because it borrows principles from the law of contracts 
without giving adequate consideration to the unique characteristics 
of the collective bargaining contract and the relative flexibility 
with which even commercial contracts are construed today. He 
argues persuasively that no matter how clear the language of the 
collective bargaining contract seems to be, it does not always tell 
the full story of the parties' intentions. Suppose, in our hypo-
thetical case, the testimony reveals that the matter of overtime 
assignments was never considered during the negotiation of the 
seniority clause-either because the parties overlooked it under the 
mistaken impression that they had covered all possible contin-
gencies or because the parties concerned themselves only with 
those situations they had previously experienced. Or suppose the 
parties simply found this seniority clause in some other agreement 
and adopted it without discussion. Anyone familiar with col-
lective bargaining knows this sort of thing does happen. And the 
contract itself is not usually ·written by people trained in semantics. 
15 See the following excerpt from 55 Am. Jur. Usages and Customs § 31 (1946): 
"Perhaps the most fundamental of the rules which limit the introduction of a custom or 
usage . • • is that which denies the admissibility of such evidence where its purpose or 
effect is to contradict the plain, unambiguous terms .•. expressed in the contract itself, 
or to vary or qualify terms which are free from ambiguity •••• It [custom or usage] 
may explain what is ambiguous but it cannot vary or contradict what is manifest and 
plain .••• An express written contract embodying in clear and positive terms the intention 
of the parties cannot be varied by evidence of usage or custom which either expressly or 
by necessary implication contradicts the terms of such contract." 
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It is hardly surprising therefore to find in the typical contract an 
"inartistic and inaccurate use of words that have a precise and com-
monly accepted meaning in law."16 The word "only" in the 
hypothetical case may merely be attributable to an inexperienced 
or over-eager draftsman. Under these assumed circumstances, it 
cannot confidently be said that the parties intended to exclude 
overtime assignments from the scope of the seniority clause. Ab-
sent any original intention with respect to this problem, Aaron 
concludes that the long-standing practice of making overtime as-
signments by seniority should be controlling. 
This conclusion appears to be supported by two different ra-
tionales. First, the argument seems to be that contract language is 
no clearer than the underlying intention of the parties.17 Hence, 
where it is shown that their intention was uncertain or incomplete, 
the language cannot be considered truly unambiguous. It follows 
that past practice is being used not to contradict what is plain but 
rather to add to what is already a part of the agreement. Second, 
the argument is that to adopt the overtime assignment practice 
"does not alter the agreement but merely takes note of a modifica-
tion that has already been made either by the parties jointly or by 
the unilateral action of the employer tacitly approved by the 
union."18 The practice, in short, amounts to an amendment of 
the agreement. 
I find much merit in what Aaron says. And there are several 
reported decisions which indicate his views are shared by others 
as well.19 The real question, however, is whether as serious a 
matter as the modification of clear contract language can be based 
on practice alone. Some arbitrators have held, I think with good 
reason, that practice should prevail only if the proofs are sufficient-
ly strong to warrant saying there was in effect mutual agreement 
to the modification.20 The parties must, to use the words in one 
decision, "have evinced a positive acceptance or endorsement" of 
16 Aaron, supra note 10, at 5. 
17 As Judge Cardozo put it, "few words are so plain that the context or the occasion 
is without capacity to enlarge or narrow their extension." 
18 Aaron, supra note 10, at 6. 
19 See, e.g., Metropolitan Coach Lines, 27 Lab. Arb. 376, 383 (1956); Smith Display 
Service, 17 Lab. Arb. 524, 526 (1951). 
20 See, e.g., National Lead Co., 28 Lab. Arb. 470, 474 (1957); Gibson Refrigerator Co., 
17 Lab. Arb. 313, 318 (1951); Texas-New Mexico Pipe Line Co., 17 Lab. Arb. 90, 91 
(1951); Merrill-Stevens Dry Dock 8: Repair Co., IO Lab. Arb. 562, 563 (1948); Pittsburgh 
Plate Glass Co., 8 Lab. Arb. 317, 332 (1947). For still another viewpoint, see Pearce Davis' 
comments on Aaron's hypothetical case. He stated he too would consider the overtime 
assignment practice to be enforceable but only if it were established "that the practice 
had been initiated by actual discussion and agreement of both parties." Supra note 10, 
at 15. 
1961] PAST PRACTICE IN CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION 1029 
the practice.21 Thus, I believe that the modification is justified 
not by practice but rather by the parties' agreement, the existence 
of which may possibly be inferred from a clear and consistent 
practice. 
None of this reasoning is radical. The notion that the col-
lective bargaining contract is a "living document" has already won 
wide acceptance. Those responsible for a contract are free to 
change it at any time by adding an entirely new provision, by re-
writing an existing clause, or by reinterpreting some section to 
give it a meaning other than that which was originally intended. 
Grievance settlements often result in "understandings that are as 
durable, or more so, than the actual terms of the labor contract . 
• • • " 22 If a contract is susceptible to change in these ways, why 
shouldn't it be equally susceptible to change by reason of practice, 
at least where the practice represents the joint understanding of the 
parties? After all, the only ground for recognizing the modifica-
tion or amendment of a contract is some mutual agreement. And 
it can be strongly argued that the form the agreement takes is not 
important. Whether it be a formal writing, an oral understanding, 
or a long-standing practice, so long as each is supported by mutu-
ality, the parties have indeed chosen to change their contract. 
It is also worth emphasizing that Aaron's hypothetical case just 
illustrates a situation where practice conflicts with the apparent 
meaning of a seemingly unambiguous provision. But what of a 
situation where practice conflicts with the real meaning of a truly 
unambiguous provision? Suppose, for instance, that a contract 
says "seniority shall not govern the assignment of overtime work," 
that the parties meant to restrict the application of seniority, that 
a practice of distributing overtime according to seniority later de-
veloped, and that this practice was not initiated until the union 
had stated in discussions with the employer that it approved of this 
means of distributing overtime. On these facts, would the em-
ployer's unilateral discontinuance of the practice constitute a con-
tract violation? Applying the rationale stated in Aaron's paper, 
I would find no violation on the ground that practice can be 
decisive only if there is some uncertainty, however slight, with 
respect to the parties' original intention. My hypothetical case 
contains no such uncertainty, the parties' intention being perfectly 
obvious. Yet, if the "living document" notion is carried to its 
21 Bethlehem Steel Co., 13 Lab. Arb. 556, 560 (1949). 
22 Taylor, Effectuating the Labor Contract Through Arbitration, NATIONAL ACADEMY 
OF ARBITRATORS, THE PROFESSION OF LABOR ARBITRATION 20, 21 (BNA 1957). 
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logical conclusion, a violation may exist on the ground that the 
practice, being a product of joint determination, amounts to an 
amendment of the contract and that thereafter the practice could 
be changed only by mutual agreement. Some may complain that 
the contract is so clear and compelling here that no room is left for 
consideration of past practice. However, as Williston has ex-
plained in his famous treatise on contracts, "if the meaning of the 
contract is plain, the acts of the parties cannot prove an interpreta-
tion contrary to the plain meaning" but nevertheless "such con-
duct of the parties ... may be evidence of a subsequent modifica-
tion of their contract."23 
D. As a Separate, Enforceable Condition of Employment 
Past practice may serve to clarify, implement, and even amend 
contract language. But these are not its only functions. Some-
times an established practice is regarded as a distinct and binding 
condition of employment, one which cannot be changed without 
the mutual consent of the parties. Its binding quality may arise 
either from a contract provision which specifically requires the 
continuance of existing practices or, absent such a provision, from 
the theory that long-standing practices which have been accepted 
by the parties become an integral part of the agreement with just 
as much force as any of its written provisions. 
There are different kinds of contract provisions regarding past 
practice. Some merely state that practices shall govern one small 
phase of the employment relationship. For instance, "bidding 
on job vacancies shall be in accordance with past practice." Others 
broadly embrace practices with little or no qualification. For in-
stance, "all practices and conditions not specified in this contract 
shall remain the same for the duration of the contract."24 Still 
others require that practices be continued during the term of the 
agreement but allow management to change or eliminate a prac-
tice upon the occurrence of certain stated conditions. 
No discussion of this subject would be complete without some 
mention of the experiences of the basic steel industry. The typical 
steel agreement provides that "any local working conditions in 
effect which have existed regularly over a period of time under the 
applicable circumstances ... shall remain in effect for the term of 
23 3 WILLISTON, CoNTRACI"S § 623 (rev. ed. 1936). 
24 See Reilly, Labor Law for Practitioners, 8 LAB. L.J. 19, 23 (1957) for the attitude 
of many management attorneys to clauses of this kind. 
1961] PAST PRACTICE IN CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION 1031 
this Agreement .... "25 In this way, there has been incorporated 
into the steel agreements a wide variety of practices affecting 
wages, crew sizes, relief time, work assignments, and many other 
matters.26 The "local working conditions" clause is thus the 
source of important rights and obligations, many of which are 
somewhat obscured by the bustle of daily plant operations. It is 
this uncertainty as to the nature and extent of the commitment 
which seems most disturbing to steel management. However, a 
"local working condition" is not by nature unalterable. It may 
be changed or eliminated either by mutual agreement or by the 
employer if it can establish (1) that it has through the exercise of 
managerial discretion changed or eliminated "the basis for the 
existence of the local working condition" and (2) that a reasonable 
causal relationship exists between the change in the basis for the 
working condition and the change in the working condition itself. 
The steel agreements thus seek to balance the employee's interest 
in preserving benefits which derive from established practices and 
the manager's interest in being able to alter practices to suit chang-
ing industrial circumstances and thereby enhance efficiency. The 
"local working conditions" clause is, in short, a compromise be-
tween stability on the one hand and flexibility on the other. 
I would like to illustrate the application of this clause with a 
hypothetical case. Suppose that certain mill equipment has been 
run by five men for many years, that this arrangement was origi-
nally based upon supervision's evaluation of the amount of work 
involved, and that the five-man crew has come to be recognized as 
a "local working condition." If technological improvements are 
made in the equipment and if these improvements substantially 
decrease the crew's workload, it has been held that the employer 
will have changed "the basis for the existence of the local working 
condition." Hence, it will be free to change the "local working 
condition" itself, that is, to reduce the crew size. The only 
proviso is that a reasonable "cause-effect" relationship exist be-
tween the change in the basis for the practice and the change in 
the practice itself. 
211 The contract language quoted in this paragraph and in the following footnote 
can be found in section 2-B of the U.S. Steel-Steelworkers agreement and article one, sec-
tion ll of the Republic Steel-Steelworkers Agreement. 
26 "Local working conditions" are defined in the steel agreements as "specific prac-
tices or customs which reflect detailed application of the subject matter within the scope 
of wages, hours of work, or other conditions of employment and includes local agreements, 
written or oral, or such matters." 
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However, even without technological improvements, the em-
ployer may be confident that the operation can be adequately per-
formed with four men instead of five by reassigning duties among 
the crew members or by eliminating some of their idle time. Or 
the employer may belatedly discover that the original supervisory 
estimates of the work involved were completely wrong and that the 
crew should never have been larger than four men. But these 
circumstances, it has been held, do not change "the basis for the 
existence of the local working condition" and hence do not justify 
a reduction in crew size. Such a reduction must almost always be 
based upon some technological advance, either in equipment or in 
manufacturing processes. A "local working condition," in other 
words, need not yield to greater efficiency alone. Furthermore, 
the "local working conditions" clause places a premium on prompt 
and careful judgment in any area affecting conditions of employ-
ment. Where, for instance, an improved manufacturing process 
warrants a crew reduction but management fails to take any action, 
its failure may ultimately result in a new "local working condition" 
which will saddle the operation with the old crew. Thus, an em-
ployer is forced to live with an error or a mistake in judgment once 
it becomes embedded in a "local working condition." To this 
extent, the clause may prevent management from realizing opti-
mum efficiency but management must bear some of the respon-
sibility for this result. This hypothetical case indicates the kind 
of problems which may arise in the administration of a past prac-
tice provision. 
Most agreements, however, say nothing about management 
having to maintain existing conditions. They ordinarily do not 
even mention the subject of past practice. The question then is 
whether, apart from any basis in the agreement, an established 
practice can nevertheless be considered a binding condition of 
employment. The answer, I think, depends upon one's concep-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement. To use Harry Shul-
man's words, "is the agreement an exclusive statement of rights 
and privileges or does it subsume continuation of existing condi-
tions?"27 
Employers tend to argue that the only restrictions placed upon 
management are those contained in the agreement and that in all 
other respects management is free to act in what ever way it sees 
fit. Or to put the argument in the more familiar "reserved rights" 
terminology, management continues to have the rights it cus-
21 Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HAR.v. L. REv. 999, 1011 (1955). 
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tomarily possessed and which it has not surrendered through col-
lective bargaining. If an agreement does not require the con-
tinuance of existing conditions, a practice, being merely an extra-
contractual consideration, would have no binding force regardless 
of how well-established it may be. It follows that management 
may change or eliminate the practice without the union's consent. 
Unions take an entirely different view of the problem. They 
emphasize the unique qualities of the collective bargaining agree-
ment and the background against which the agreement was 
negotiated, particularly those practices which have come to be 
accepted by employees and supervisors alike and have thus become 
an important part of the working environment. The agreement is 
executed in the light of this working environment and on the 
assumption that existing practices will remain in effect. There-
fore, to the extent that these practices are unchallenged during 
negotiations, the parties must be held to have adopted them and 
made them a part of their agreement.28 
Many arbitrators have, at some time in their careers, been con-
fronted by these arguments. Some have held that the agreement 
is the exclusive source of rights and privileges;29 others have held 
that the agreement may subsume continuation of 
1
existing condi-
tions.30 The latter is the more prevalent view. Those who follow 
it have prohibited employers from unilaterally changing or elimi-
nating practices with regard to efficiency bonus plans,31 paid lunch 
periods,32 wash-up periods on company time,33 maternity leaves 
of absence,34 free milk,85 and home electricity at nominal rates.86 
The reasoning behind these decisions begins with the proposition 
that the parties have not set down on paper the whole of their 
agreement. "One cannot reduce all the rules governing a commu-
28 See Management's Reserved Rights: A Labor View, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRA-
TORS, MANAGEMENT RIGHTS AND THE ARBITRATION PROCESS 118, 126 (BNA 1956). 
20 See, e.g., National Distillers Products Corp., 24 Lab. Arb. 500 (1953); Donaldson 
Co., 20 Lab. Arb. 826 (1953); New York Trap Rock Corp., 19 Lab. Arb. 421 (1952); 
Byerlite Corp., 12 Lab. Arb. 641 (1949); M. T. Stevens & Sons Co., 7 Lab. Arb. 585 (1947). 
30 See, e.g., Fruehauf Trailer Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 372 (1957); Morris P. Kirk & Son, Inc., 
27 Lab. Arb. 6 (1956); E. W. Bliss Co., 24 Lab. Arb. 614 (1955); Phillips Petroleum Co., 
24 Lab. Arb. 191 (1955); Northland Greyhound Lines, Inc., 23 Lab. Arb. 277 (1954); 
International Harvester Co., 20 Lab. Arb. 276 (1953); American Seating Co., 16 Lab. Arb. 
115 (1951); California Cotton Mills Co., 14 Lab. Arb. 377 (1950); Franklin Ass'n of Chicago, 
7 Lab. Arb. 614 (1947). 
31 Libby, McNeill & Libby, 5 Lab. Arb. 564 (1946); Pullman-Standard Car Mfg. Co., 
2 Lab. Arb. 509 (1945). 
32 E. W. Bliss Co., 24 Lab. Arb. 614 (1955). 
33 International Harvester Co., 20 Lab. Arb. 276 (1953). 
34 Northland Greyhound Lines, Inc., 23 Lab. Arb. 277 (1954). 
3fi Ryan Aeronautical Co., 17 Lab. Arb. 395 (1951). 
30 Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 Lab. Arb. 191 (1955). 
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nity like an industrial plant to fifteen or even fifty pages."37 Thus, 
the union-management contract includes not just the written pro-
visions stated therein but also the understandings and mutually 
acceptable practices which have developed over the years. Because 
the contract is executed in the context of these understandings and 
practices, the negotiators must be presumed to be fully aware of 
them and to have relied upon them in striking their bargain. 
Hence, if a particular practice is not repudiated during negotia-
tions, it may fairly be said that the contract was entered into upon 
the assumption that this practice would continue in force. By their 
silence, the parties have given assent to "existing modes of proce-
dure."38 In this way, practices may by implication become an in-
tegral part of the contract.39 
Archibald Cox not only agrees with this view but states the 
argument more strongly. In asserting that the words of the contract 
cannot be the exclusive source of rights and duties, he emphasizes 
the following point: 
"Within the sphere of collective bargaining, the institu-
tional characteristics and the governmental nature of the col-
lective-bargaining process demand a common law of the shop 
which implements and furnishes the context of the agreement. 
We must assume that intelligent negotiators acknowledged so 
plain a need unless they stated a contrary rule in plain 
words."40 
37 Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1482, 1499 (1959). 
38 In this connection, note the analysis made by Douglass V. Brown in Management 
Rights and the Collective Agreement, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST .ANNUAL MEETING OF THE 
INDUSTRlAL RELATIONS REsEARCH ASSOCIATION 145-55 (IRRA, 1949). Brown expressed his 
argument in these words: "But when all of the provisions are written, it will be found 
that many matters which affect conditions of employment are not specifically referred to. 
Does this mean that these matters are of no concern to the parties, or that the agreement 
has no meaning with respect to them? I think not. On some of these matters, the parties 
are satisfied with existing modes of procedure, consciously or unconsciously. On others, 
one party or the other may be dissatisfied but may be unable to devise better modes. On 
still others, one party may have preferred an alternative but may have been unable to 
secure agreement from the other party, or may have been unwilling to pay the price 
necessary for acceptance. In any event, the omission of specific reference is significant. 
" ... The agreement, no matter how short, does provide a guide to modes of proce• 
dure and to the rights of the parties on all matters affecting the conditions of employment. 
Where explicit provisions are made, the question is relatively simple. But even where 
the agreement is silent, the parties have, by their silence, given assent to a continuation 
of the existing modes of procedure." 
39 This implication of course would not be possible if it conflicted with the express 
language of the contract. For example, if a contract said "the written provisions consti-
tute the entire agreement of the parties," it would be difficult to imply that the parties 
meant to make practices a part of their contract. 
40 Cox, supra note 37. 
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The common law of the shop would include, at the very least, long-
standing practices in the plant. 
None of this is incompatible with ordinary contract law. Wil-
liston says that a usage, in our jargon a practice, is admissible "for 
the purpose of adding a new element or term or incident, which-
ever one is pleased to call it, to the expressed terms of the contract" 
and that "it may be shown that a matter concerning which the 
written contract is silent, is affected by a usage with which both 
parties are chargeable."41 Indeed, some courts have decided that 
when an employee is hired or an agent appointed, the nature of 
his duties and his compensation as well may not be stated but may 
nevertheless be fixed by what is customary and reasonable.42 In 
one case, a practice between railroads and their employees was held 
admissible to establish an implied agreement to pay time and one-
half for overtime work.43 
But this theory, insofar as it relates to the collective bargaining 
agreement, is open to criticism. To repeat, the majority view is 
that established practices which were in existence when the agree-
ment was negotiated and which were not discussed during nego-
tiations are binding upon the parties and must be continued for 
the life of the agreement. This is said to be an implied condition 
of the agreement. In the courts, implications of this kind are 
"based on morality, common understanding, social policy, and 
legal duty expressed in tort or quasi-contract."44 These considera-
tions, however, are not much help to arbitrators. If we are the 
servants of the parties alone and not the public, I doubt that "social 
policy" would be a sound basis for drawing an implication. If our 
job is to seek out the parties' values and not to impose others' 
values upon them, I doubt that "morality" would provide the 
basis for an implication. If our powers arise from the parties' 
agreement and not from the labor laws, I doubt that a "legal duty" 
found in such legislation would be relevant. Consider, for in-
stance, the legal duty to bargain under the Labor-Management 
Relations Act. Apart from the question of whether we may enforce 
that duty, the real issue is "whether the practice may be changed 
41 WILLISTON, CoNTRACl'S § 652 (rev. ed. 1936). 
42See Vanemburg v. Duffey, 177 Ark. 663, 7 S.W.2d 336 (1928) (broker's commission 
fixed by practice); Voell v. Klein, 184 Wis. 620, 200 N.W. 364 (1924) (authority of sales 
agent to accept used car as part payment for new one held established by practice of 
automobile dealers). 
43 McGuire v. Interurban Ry., 199 Iowa 203, 200 N.W. 55 (1924). 
44 Shulman, supra note 27, at 1012. The analysis made in this paragraph is based upon 
Shulman's paper. 
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without mutual consent when bargaining has failed to achieve 
consent."45 Thus, the arbitrator's power to establish implied con-
ditions derives not from the superior authority of the law but 
rather from the parties' will, from their "common understanding." 
He may find implications which "may reasonably be inferred from 
some term of the agreement"46 or even from the agreement as a 
whole. The implication here that existing practices must be con-
tinued until changed by mutual consent is drawn from the nature 
of the agreement itself and from the collective bargaining process. 
It would be justified, I am sure, wherever there is a real or tacit 
understanding during negotiations that existing practices would 
be continued. While such an understanding may exist in some 
relationships, I think Shulman is probably correct in concluding: 
"It is more than doubtful that there is any general under-
standing among employers and unions as to the viability of 
existing practices during the term of a collective agreement . 
. . . I venture to guess that in many enterprises the execution 
of a collective agreement would be blocked if it were insisted 
that it contain a broad provision that 'all existing practices, 
except as modified by this agreement, shall be continued for 
the life thereof, unless changed by mutual consent.' And I 
suppose that execution would also be blocked if the converse 
provision were demanded, namely, that 'the employer shall be 
free to change any existing practice except as he is restricted 
by the terms of this agreement.' The reasons for the block 
would be, of course, the great uncertainty as to the nature 
and extent of the commitment, and the relentless search for 
cost-saving changes ... .''47 
It is one thing to say, as Shulman suggests, that the implication 
is warranted where the evidence indicates that the parties had a 
"common understanding" to continue existing practices; it is quite 
another to say, as the majority suggest, that the implication is 
warranted because it may be assumed, unless otherwise stated in 
negotiations, that the parties had such a "common understand-
ing."48 The difference in viewpoints is clear. Shulman wants some 
proof of what the majority ordinarily assumes. Shulman's approach 




48 Or to take this one step further, as Cox suggests, it may be assumed unless other-
wise stated in the agreement, that the parties had such a "common understanding." Cox, 
supra note 37. 
1961] PAST PRACTICE IN CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION 1037 
binding condition of employment. Think of the difficulty one 
might encounter in trying to establish that the unstated assump-
tion of the negotiators on both sides of the table was to continue 
existing practices. The majority approach, on the other hand, 
comes close to engrafting a "past practice" clause onto the typical 
collective agreement without regard to the actual assumptions of 
the negotiators. Their silence at the bargaining table is presumed 
to constitute assent to existing conditions, whether they thought 
of this or not. 
There are other possibilities too. We may find that the parties 
had no "common understanding" to continue practices in general 
but did have a "common understanding" to continue a particular 
practice. Much of this discussion has related to practices in general. 
Yet, an arbitration case rarely poses so broad a problem. We are 
usually asked to decide only whether a specific practice, say, a paid 
lunch period, must be continued in effect. Where possible, the 
answer should be as narrow as the question. To the extent to 
which the answer goes further and seeks to determine whether the 
agreement subsumes the continuation of existing conditions, the 
arbitrator risks deciding far more than the parties want him to 
decide. The dangers are magnified too by the fact that the arbi-
trator is not likely to elicit a clear picture of the assumptions upon 
which the agreement was negotiated. 
Still another problem exists. Those of us who accept the prin-
ciple that an agreement may require the continuance of existing 
practices recognize that this principle cannot be allowed to freeze all 
existing conditions. For instance, the long-time use of hand-con-
trolled grinding machines could hardly be regarded as a practice 
prohibiting the introduction of automatic grinding machines. Or 
the long-time use of pastel colors in painting plant interiors could 
not preclude management from changing to a different color 
scheme. Plainly, not all practices can be considered binding con-
ditions of employment. Thus, while we are willing to imply that 
practices are a part of the agreement, we are apprehensive of the 
breadth of the implication. What seems correct from a theoretical 
point of view does not always make sense from a practical point 
of view. Arbitrators, accordingly, have accepted the implication 
but sought to limit it to just certain kinds of practices. The diffi-
culty is to determine what kind of rational line, if any, can be 
drawn between those practices which may be incorporated into the 
agreement and those which may not. 
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Some decisions enforce only those practices concerning "major" 
conditions of employment as contrasted to "minor" conditions.40 
But the test seems inadequate for several reasons. To begin with, 
it is vague and inexact. What is major to one group of employees 
may be minor to all the others; what is major from the standpoint 
of morale may be minor from the standpoint of earnings and job 
security. There is no logical basis for distinguishing between ma-
jor and minor conditions, unless the arbitrator is to concern him-
self only with serious violations of the agreement. More important, 
this kind of test encourages arbitrators "to commence their think-
ing with what they consider a desirable decision and then work 
backward to appropriate premises, devising syllogisms to justify 
that decision .... "50 That is, if an arbitrator decides to enforce 
the practice he calls it a major condition, and if he decides other-
wise he calls it a minor condition. To this extent, the test provides 
us with a rationalization rather than a reason for our ruling. 
The Elkouris have suggested a comparable test.51 They would 
enforce only those practices which involve "employee benefits"; 
they would not prohibit changes in practices which involve "basic 
management functions." This test, however, is no more convincing 
than the major-minor test. It suffers from the same defects. It too 
encourages the arbitrator to work backward from his decision, 
thus providing him with a rationalization rather than a reason for 
his ruling. To enforce a practice all he need say is that it concerns 
employee benefits. But the fact is that most practices which create 
such benefits are likely to impinge upon some basic management 
function. Consider a situation where the employer wishes to re-
duce a long-established crew size based upon a recent engineering 
survey of his plant. How is the crew size practice to be character-
ized? It involves the direction of the working force and the deter-
mination of methods of operation, customary management func-
tions, but it also involves the job security of one or more members 
of the crew, a very real employee benefit. In the closer cases, this 
49 See, e.g., Pan Am Southern Corp., 25 Lab. Arb. 611, 613 (1955); Phillips Petroleum 
Co., 24 Lab. Arb. 191, 194 (1955); Continental Baking Co., 20 Lab. Arb. 309, 311 (1953); 
General Aniline & Film Corp., 19 Lab. Arb. 628, 629 (1952). Cox and John Dunlop, in 
an article dealing with national labor policy, urged that "a collective bargaining agree-
ment should be deemed, unless a contrary intention is manifest, to carry forward for its 
term the major terms and conditions of employment, not covered by the agreement, 
which prevailed when the agreement was executed." See The Duty To Bargain Collec-
tively During the Term of an Existing Agreement, 63 HAR.v. L. REv. 1097, 1116-17 (1950). 
50 Frank, Experimental Jurisprudence and the New Deal, 78 CoNG. REc. 12412, 12413 
(1934). 
1>1 ELKOURI & ELKOURI, How ARBITRAnoN WORKS 274--75 (BNA 1960). 
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test provides no satisfactory guidance. Besides, it seems to me that 
if the parties have in effect agreed to the continuation of a particu-
lar practice, it should be binding regardless of its subject matter. 
A few decisions enforce the practice if it involves a "working 
condition" rather than a "gift" or a "gratuity."52 This distinction 
is meaningful only in that class of cases which concern employee 
bonuses or other extra-contractual employee compensation. Apart 
from its limited applicability, however, this test does suggest that 
what is important here is not the subject matter of the practice but 
rather the extent to which the practice is founded upon the agree-
ment of the parties. 
A better test, I think, is suggested by what Shulman said in a 
decision53 he made as umpire under the Ford-UAW agreement, 
an agreement which did not require the continuance of existing 
practices. He urged that the controlling question in this kind of 
case is whether or not the practice was supported by "mutual 
agreement." He explained his position in these words: 
"A practice thus based on mutual agreement may be sub-
ject to change only by mutual agreement. Its binding quality 
is due, however, not to the fact that it is past practice but 
rather to the agreement in which it is based. 
"But there are other practices which are not the result of 
joint determination at all. They may be mere happenstance, 
that is, methods that developed without design or delibera-
tion. Or they may be choices by Management in the exercise 
of managerial discretion as to convenient methods at the time. 
In such cases there is no thought of obligation or commitment 
for the future. Such practices are merely present ways, not 
prescribed ways, of doing things. The relevant item of sig-
nificance is not the nature of the particular method but the 
managerial freedom with respect to it. Being the product of 
managerial determination in its permitted discretion such 
practices are, in the absence of contractual provision to the 
contrary, subject to change in the same discretion .... But 
there is no requirement of mutual agreement as a condition 
precedent to a change of a practice of this character. 
"A contrary holding would place past practice on a par 
1\Tith written agreement and create the anomaly that, while 
152 See Fawick Airflex. Co., 11 Lab. Arb. 666, 668-69 (1948). Bonuses were held to be 
an integral part of the wage structure in the following cases: Nazareth Mills, Inc., 22 Lab. 
Arb. 808 (1954); Felsway Shoe Corp., 17 Lab. Arb. 505 (1951). Bonuses were held to be 
gratuities in the following cases: American Lava Corp., 32 Lab. Arb. 395 (1959); Rockwell-
Standard Corp., 32 Lab. Arb. 388 (1959); Bassick Co., 26 Lab. Arb. 627 (1956). 
53 Shulman, supra note 6. 
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the parties expend great energy and time in negotiating the 
details of the Agreement, they unknowingly and uninten-
tionally commit themselves to unstated and perhaps more im-
portant matters which in the future may be found to have 
been past practice."54 
Under this test, only a practice which is supported by the mutual 
agreement of the parties would be enforceable. Such a practice 
would be binding, regardless of how minor it may be and regard-
less of the extent to which it may affect a traditional management 
function. Absent this mutuality, however, the practice would be 
subject to change in management's discretion. Although this seems 
a sound way of distinguishing between enforceable and non-en-
forceable practices, one might understandably ask what constitutes 
"mutual agreement." Is it necessary to establish an express under-
standing or is it sufficient to show that the practice is of such long 
standing that the parties may properly be assumed to have agreed 
to its continuance? In other words, to what extent may the re-
quired "mutuality" be implied from the parties' actions or from 
their mere acquiescence in a given course of conduct? Even the 
Shulman test does not provide us with a complete answer to this 
extremely vexing problem. I suspect that we would be far more 
likely to infer "mutuality" in a practice concerning "employee 
benefits" than in one concerning "basic management functions." 
To this extent, Shulman and the Elkouris may well have something 
in common. 
Ill. DURATION AND TERMINATION OF A PRACTICE 
Once the parties become bound by a practice, they may wonder 
how long it will be binding and how it can be terminated. 
Consider first a practice which is, apart from any basis in the 
agreement, an enforceable condition of employment on the theory 
that the agreement subsumes the continuance of existing condi-
tions. Such a practice cannot be unilaterally changed during the 
life of the agreement. For, as I explained earlier in this paper, if 
a practice is not discussed during negotiations many of us are 
likely to infer that the agreement was executed on the assumption 
that the practice would remain in effect. The inference is based 
largely on the parties' acquiescence in the practice. If either side 
should, during the negotiation of a later agreement, object to the 
continuance of this practice, it could not be inferred from the 
54 Id. at 241-42. See also International Harvester Co., 20 Lab. Arb. 276 (195!!). 
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signing of a new agreement that the parties intended the practice 
to remain in force. Without their acquiescence, the practice would 
no longer be a binding condition of employment. In face of a 
timely repudiation of a practice by one party, the other must have 
the practice written into the agreement if it is to continue to be 
binding. 
Consider next a well-established practice which serves to clarify 
some ambiguity in the agreement. Because the practice is essential 
to an understanding of the ambiguous provision, it becomes in 
effect a part of that provision. As such, it will be binding for the 
life of the agreement. And the mere repudiation of the practice 
by one side during the negotiation of a new agreement, unless 
accompanied by a revision of the ambiguous language, would not 
be significant. For the repudiation alone would not change the 
meaning of the ambiguous provision and hence would not detract 
from the effectiveness of the practice. It is a well-settled principle 
that where past practice has established a meaning for language 
that is subsequently used in an agreement, the language will be 
presumed to have the meaning given it by practice. Thus, this 
kind of practice can be terminated only by mutual agreement, 
that is, by the parties re·writing the ambiguous provision to super-
sede the practice, by eliminating the provision entirely, etc. 
Consider finally the effect of changing circumstances on the 
viability of a practice during the contract term. Where the condi-
tions which give rise to a practice no longer exist, the employer is 
not obliged to continue to apply the practice. Suppose, for in-
stance, that crane operators who handle extremely hot materials 
have for years been given a certain amount of relief time during 
their shift and that after installing an air-conditioning unit in one 
of the crane cabs the employer refuses to give any more relief time 
to the operator of that crane. Whether the employer's action is 
justifiable depends upon the reason behind the relief time practice. 
If relief was given because of the extreme heat alone, there would 
be good reason for denying any relief to the operator in the air-
conditioned cab. The circumstances underlying the practice would 
no longer be pertinent to this particular craneman. If, on the other 
hand, relief was given because of the high degree of concentration 
and care demanded in running these cranes there would be good 
reason to continue relief time for this craneman. The circum-
stances underlying the practice would still be relevant to his situa-
tion, even though he now has the benefit of air-conditioning. In 
other words, a practice must be carefully related to the conditions 
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from which it arose. Whenever those conditions substantially 
change, the practice may be subject to termination. 
CONCLUSION 
Through past practice, the arbitrator learns something of the 
values and standards of the parties and thus gains added insight 
into the nature of their contractual rights and obligations. Prac-
tices tend to disclose the reasonable expectations of the employees 
and managers alike. And as long as our decision is made within 
the bounds of these expectations, it has a better chance of being 
understood and accepted. 
The ideas expressed in this paper may be useful as a general 
guide to the uses of past practice in administering the collective 
agreement. They do not provide an easy formula for resolving 
disputes; they are no substitute for a thorough and painstaking 
analysis of the facts. In the problem areas of past practice, there 
are so many fine distinctions that the final decision in a case will 
rest not on any abstract theorizing but rather on the arbitrator's 
view of the peculiar circumstances of that case. In other words, 
no matter how successful we may be in systematizing the standards 
which shape arbitral opinions, we must recognize that considerable 
room must be left for "art and intuition,''55 for good judgment. 
55 Cox, supra note 37, at 1500. 
